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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1001 
 ___________ 
 
TAKEFUMI UCHIDA, a/k/a Wu Mei Dong, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                      Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A096 030 569) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Alberto J. Riefkohl 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 22, 2011 
 Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 









 Takefumi Uchida, a.k.a. Wu Mei Dong (“Dong”),1 petitions for review of an order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which ordered Dong removed to China, 
and which sustained the Government‟s appeal from an Immigration Judge‟s (“IJ”) order 
granting Dong asylum.  We will deny the petition for review. 
Dong is a native and citizen of China.  Soon after his marriage in 1984, he and his 
wife had their first child.  Dong‟s wife was forced to have an IUD implanted, but five 
years later she became pregnant again.
2
  When the birth of the child was imminent, the 
couple went to a hospital, where Dong was threatened with detention unless he paid a 
fine of 5,000 RMB.  Dong paid the fine, and the child was born.  Sometime after the 
child‟s birth, over Dong‟s objection, his wife was sterilized. 
Dong entered the United States without inspection in January 2004.  He was 
placed in removal proceedings in February 2004, and he applied for asylum on the basis 
of his resistance to China‟s coercive population control policy.  In June 2008, the IJ 
granted Dong asylum.  The IJ found that Dong had protested his wife‟s sterilization, and 
that the fine amounted to coercion by the authorities.  This, according to the IJ, placed 
Dong within the third and fourth tiers set forth in Matter of J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520 
(A.G. 2008); i.e., a person who was persecuted for resistance to a coercive population 
control program, or one who had a well-founded fear that he would be forced to undergo 
involuntary sterilization or be persecuted for refusing to do so.  The BIA sustained the 
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  The record does not explain whether the IUD was still in place. 
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Government‟s appeal and ordered Dong removed to China.  It found that Dong had not 
established that he was a refugee, or that he engaged in “other resistance” to China‟s 
population policy.  It further concluded that the fine that Dong paid did not constitute 
economic persecution.  Finally, it found that there was no objective basis to conclude that 
Dong had a well-founded fear of future prosecution.  Dong filed a timely, counseled 
petition for review with this Court. 
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal of the BIA under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1).  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2001).  We must sustain 
the BIA‟s removal order if there is substantial evidence in the record to support it.  
Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 2001). 
An applicant seeking asylum bears the burden of showing that he is a “refugee”; 
that is, he is “a person who is unable or unwilling to return to his country „because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.‟”  Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 
F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2003), quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.13(a) (allocating burden of proof).  Further, a person who has been persecuted for 
failure or refusal to undergo a forced abortion or involuntary sterilization, or “for other 
resistance to a coercive population program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on 
account of political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B).  Persecution does not include 
all treatment regarded as unjust or unfair; rather, it must be “so severe that [it] 
constitute[s] a real threat to life or freedom.”  Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 518 
(3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 
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Dong argues that the BIA applied an incorrect standard of review when it 
“improperly reviewed de novo IJ Riefkohl‟s finding that Petitioner established a well-
founded fear of persecution.”  Petitioner‟s Brief at 5.  The portion of the IJ‟s oral decision  
regarding Dong‟s well-founded fear of persecution; i.e., whether he would likely be 
persecuted in the future if he returned to China, is quite muddled: 
[T]his case [has] at least an element of objection of his own with an 
element of possibility of actions against him have been met and that is 
sufficient for the Court to establish a well-founded fear of persecution at 
that moment.  Obviously, returning the Respondent to the People‟s 
Republic of China at this moment may subject him to summarization of 
actions or obviously sees the wife has been already sterilized, still 
sterilizing or subjecting the Respondent to an effect on the operation does 
not make too much sense.  However, that would be speculative on the 
Court to determine what actions if any the Government of the People‟s 
Republic of China may subject upon the Respondent if he is returned at this 
stage and the Court feels it does not have to engage in that.  Suffice it to say 
that on the record that I have examined, the Court finds that the Respondent 
has established a meaning on threshold on the theory of the well founded 
fear of persecution independent from the actions taken against his wife, 
again, based on the supposition to those actions and the threat to him of 
possible incarceration. 
 
A.R. 57-58.  Dong properly notes that the BIA is to review an IJ‟s finding that an asylum 
applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution, under a “clearly erroneous” standard.  
Huang v. Att‟y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 383 (3d Cir. 2010).  While the BIA did not use the 
words “clearly erroneous,” the BIA‟s decision notes that “the possibility of further harm 
to [Dong], especially this many years after the event in question, is wholly speculative, 
with no objective basis.”  A.R. 3.  It appears clear to us that the BIA found the IJ‟s 
finding “clearly erroneous,” and we agree.  The record does not establish that Dong has 
any reason to fear persecution upon his return to China.     
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As to his asylum eligibility based on past persecution, the BIA here properly noted 
that Dong was not eligible for asylum based solely on his wife‟s forced abortion.  Lin-
Zheng v. Att‟y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  Dong implicitly 
acknowledges this, but argues that he established past persecution based on his own 
resistance to China‟s family planning policy.  See id. at 157 (noting that spouses remain 
eligible for relief if they qualify as a refugee under § 1101(a)(42) based upon their own 
persecution, or well-founded fear of persecution, for “other resistance” to a coercive 
population control program).  As evidence of resistance, Dong notes that he had to pay a 
fine or face arrest.  Even if these actions constitute “other resistance,” the record does not 
compel a finding that his experiences based on that resistance rise to the level of 
persecution.  The record contains no indication that paying the fine was a severe hardship 
for Dong; in fact, he paid the fine the day after it was imposed.  See Cheng v. Att‟y Gen., 
623 F.3d 175, 195 (3d Cir. 2010) (imposition of modest fine does not rise to level of 
persecution). 
Because Dong did not meet the burden of showing that he is eligible for asylum, 
he necessarily does not meet the higher burden for withholding of removal.  Chen v. 
Att‟y Gen., No. 09-3459, ---F.3d---, 2011 WL 923353, at *5 (3d Cir. March 18, 2011).  
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
